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I.   INTRODUCTION 
The early phases of the COVID pandemic in 2020 prompted a quick relaxation of prudential 
regulations. Across the globe, government officials deployed an arsenal of policies to support 
banks’ lending capacity, including the issuance of government guarantees on bank credit, 
releasing countercyclical bank capital buffers, and postponing the introduction of accounting 
standards on expected credit losses. In parallel, monetary policy rates were cut and many 
central banks implemented large scale asset purchase programs and other liquidity facilities 
to support the flow of credit to the economy. These policies tried to achieve a delicate 
balance between two conflicting goals: averting a contraction in bank credit while preserving 
bank capital buffers to maintain financial stability. 
The view that banking crises are costly in terms of output foregone is supported by a large 
amount of research (see for example Romer and Romer, 2017 and Laeven, 2011). Yet, the 
cyclical dynamics of bank credit and the costs of supply-side contractions in bank credit are 
yet not well understood. A relatively new strand of literature has looked at the 
characterization of credit and financial cycles (Terrones, Kose, and Claessens, 2008) with 
attention focused on the analysis of the so-called credit booms and their relationship with the 
incidence of banking crises.1 While a definition of credit booms has to be widely accepted, 
most papers have used the evolution of the credit-to-GDP gap (CYGAP), typically measured 
by the deviations of the credit-to-GDP ratio from its HP-filtered trend (Drehman et al., 2010; 
2011).2 
A related object of study, also flawed by the lack of a widely accepted definition, is the 
notion of credit crunches. In loose terms, a credit crunch is a significant contraction in the 
supply of bank loans, holding constant both the risk-free real interest rate and the quality of 
potential borrowers (Bernanke and Lown, 1991). Yet, operationalizing this concept has 
proven difficult because credit supply and demand tend to be pro-cyclical. In practice, 
researchers have measured credit crunches by focusing on the lower quantiles of the credit 
growth distribution using diverse criteria. 
This paper looks at a related class of events, henceforth labeled credit reversals: episodes 
where a contraction in bank credit happens alongside expanding economic activity. This 
identifies periods when a contraction in credit can be most surely attributed to supply-driven 
factors. In fact, since credit demand is unlikely to drop with expanding economic activity, the 
definition provides a conservative filter to identify supply-side contractions in bank credit. 
 
1 Studies show that credit booms are relatively frequent. Furthermore, credit booms appear necessary, but not 
sufficient conditions for banking crises: while most crises are preceded by credit booms, only about one-third of 
the credit booms end in banking crises. See for example: Demirguc-Kunt and Detragiache, 1998; Gourinchas et 
al., 2001; Tornell and Westermann, 2002; Mendoza and Terrones, 2008; Jorda et al., 2011; Schularick et al., 
2012; Bossay et al., 2016; Borio and Lowe, 2002a; Borio and Drehman, 2009; and Gorton and Ordoñez, 2016.  
2 Alternatively, some papers have focused on the size of the credit gap, typically measured as deviations of the 
log of credit from its trend (for example, Mendoza and Terrones, 2008; Gorton and Ordoñez, 2016). 
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The definition of reversals parallels the events studied in Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2006) 
and Abiad, Dell’Ariccia, and Li (2011). Yet, their analyses focus on episodes of negative 
credit growth in the aftermath of adverse economic events (i.e., after a recession, sudden 
stop, or output collapse). In contrast, the definition used in this paper is unconditional and 
thus covers a broader class of events. 
This paper makes two main contributions to the analysis of the bank credit dynamics and its 
relationship with economic activity. First, it studies the relationship between credit reversals 
and banking crises and, in turn, between these two types of events and the shape of credit 
cycles—defined by the evolution of CYGAP ratios. In addition, it provides estimates of the 
economic costs associated with the presence of credit reversals, comparing them with those 
attributable to banking crises. 
The analysis uses country-level data at the yearly frequency, covering 179 countries during 
1960‒2017. This is the most comprehensive dataset exploited to date. We favor the use of 
yearly data as credit risk tends to evolve slowly over time and the buildup of systemic macro-
financial imbalances takes several years. Throughout the analysis, we break the data in two 
groups: industrial countries on one side and developing and emerging market countries 
(henceforth developing) on the other, searching for differences across countries with 
dissimilar levels of financial development. 
The paper presents several findings. First, credit reversals are not uncommon: they occur 
about once every five years. They are also more prevalent in developing countries. By 
comparison, banking crises occur once every eight years, and are equally likely across 
developing and industrial countries. In terms of timing, banking crises and credit reversals 
tend to happen in distinct phases of the CYGAP cycles. Crises tend to occur when the CYGAP is 
positive, while reversals are clustered in the negative phase. In fact, the likelihood of 
observing credit reversals doubles from 12 percent in the positive phase to 26 percent in the 
negative. Banking crises and credit reversals appear also related to each other: reversals 
become more likely in the aftermath of banking crises, while the likelihood of crises drops 
following credit reversals. 
By comparing cycles with- and without-reversals and taking the later as controls, the paper 
finds significant differences in the characteristics of CYGAP dynamics. Cycles with reversals 
display sharper and more protracted collapses of credit during their negative phase than their 
respective control groups. Surprisingly, parallel exercises comparing cycles with- and 
without-credit reversals suggest that credit reversals are even more constraining than banking 
crises in terms of their impact on credit availability. In fact, the economic costs of credit 
reversals, measured by the output differentials vis-à-vis cycles with no reversals, appear 
substantial—at about one-half of the estimated costs of crises and up to two-thirds after 
factoring in their relative frequencies. We also find that, in terms of output foregone, banking 
crises are more costly in industrial than in developing countries, a result that is in line with 
the findings of Bordo et al. (2001), Hoggart, Reis, and Saporta (2002), Cerra and Saxena 
(2008), Laeven and Valencia (2018). 
While arguably compelling, the use of cycles without reversals/crises as controls, does not 
establish a causal relationship running from our target events to economic activity. Thus, our 
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findings provide at most only suggestive evidence on the causal impact of credit reversals 
and baking crises on real outcomes. Yet, in relative terms, the economic costs of reversals 
vis-a-vis crises are likely more robust, as there are no clear reasons to expect differential 
endogeneity problems between reversals and crises. 
As a by-product, the paper studies key characteristics of CYGAP cycles and reports several 
patterns. As it turns out, the shape of the cycle during the positive phase in terms of duration, 
amplitude and implied changes in credit-to-GDP ratios, appears systematically related to the 
shape of the subsequent negative phase. More sizable and long-lasting CYGAP during the 
positive phase lead to deeper and longer negative gaps. As a result, larger increases in credit-
to-GDP ratios during the positive gap episodes are associated with sharper subsequent 
declines. Yet, we find no systematic relationship with the subsequent rates of credit growth 
or GDP growth, taken individually. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 discusses the operational definitions 
of credit reversals and banking crises. Section 3 describes the methodology and data. Section 
4 explores for patterns in the co-movement of bank credit and economic activity, using the 
credit cycle as a reference to frame the time dimension. Section 5 explores the relationship 
between reversals and crises and, in turn, between these two and the shape of the credit cycle. 
Section 6 presents estimates of the economic costs of reversals and crises in terms of output 
differentials between cycles with—and without—reversals and crises, using the latter as 
controls. Section 7 concludes. 
II.   CREDIT REVERSALS AND BANKING CRISES 
Before starting, we define two proxies of supply-driven, negative dynamics in credit markets. 
First, as mentioned before, we define credit reversal as an episode when credit contracts 
alongside expanding economic activity. This metric is intended to isolate events where a 
decline in credit is most likely driven by supply-side factors. As argued above, if credit 
demand does not fall with expanding economic activity, this definition should provide a 
stringent filter to identify episodes of contractions in credit supply. Since the identification of 
the episodes is data-driven, it avoids the potential researcher-induced bias of more traditional 
event analysis techniques used to identify distress in credit markets. More importantly, it 
identifies events that are less catastrophic—and therefore more common—than financial 
crises. 
It is important to note that the definition of credit reversals relates to the concepts of Phoenix 
miracles proposed by Calvo, Izquierdo and Talvi (2006) and creditless recoveries studied in 
Abiad, Dell’Ariccia, and Li (2011). However, these two later concepts focus on episodes of 
negative credit growth in the aftermath of an economic downturn (a recession, sudden stop or 
output collapse). The definition proposed in this paper is less restrictive and therefore 
encompasses a wider class of objects. It is also important to note that we identify credit 
reversals with a binary variable, but a natural and richer alternative is to use the actual data to 
measure their relative intensity. This is left for future research. 
The second proxy focuses on events where the capacity of the banking system to provide 
credit and normal financial intermediation is impaired at the systemic level. In our baseline 
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exercises, we use the operational definition and dating of banking crises proposed by Laeven 
and Valencia (2017). According to that, a banking crisis is an event that meets two 
conditions: (i) significant signs of distress in the banking system (bank runs, losses in the 
banking system, and/or bank liquidations), and (ii) significant banking policy intervention 
measures in response to large losses in the banking system. In robustness checks, we also use 
the Reinhart-Rogoff (2009) banking crises database, which identifies a banking crisis by the 
occurrence of two types of events: (i) bank runs that lead to the closure, merging, or takeover 
by the public sector of one or more financial institutions, and (ii) if there are no runs, the 
closure, merging, takeover, or large-scale government assistance of an important financial 
institution (or group of institutions), that marks the start of a string of similar outcomes for 
other financial institutions. It is important to note that, in terms of coverage, the Laeven and 
Valencia (2017) database spans 160 countries, between 1970‒2017, while the Rogoff-
Reinhart (2009) database covers 70 countries during 1800‒2010. We extend the later to 2017 
to match our macro dataset. 
III.   METHODOLOGY 
The paper looks at the relative dynamics of bank credit and economic activity throughout 
credit cycles, using event studies techniques (Gourinchas et al. 2001; Mendoza and Terrones, 
2008; 2012). In the analysis, we use credit cycles as the reference frame to study the 
relationship between credit reversals and banking crises, and their effects on credit cycles and 
economic activity. Since there is not a widely accepted operational definition of credit cycles 
and to facilitate the comparison with previous studies, we restrict ourselves to cycles defined 
by the evolution of the CYGAP, while acknowledging several important caveats.3 Specifically, 
we measure the CYGAP by detrending the ratio of credit-to-GDP with a two-sided HP filter 
with smoothing parameter λ=100 to account for the yearly frequency of the data (Mendoza 
and Terrones, 2008), and carry out robustness checks using a higher λ, as suggested by the 
BIS (2002b).4 
After computing the set of credit cycles based on the CYGAP we carry out three types of 
exercises. First, we explore if the evolution of credit and GDP during the positive phase of 
the CYGAP cycle are systematically related with their subsequent cyclical dynamics, 
Specifically, we focus on the duration of the positive and negative phases, the pace of credit 
 
3 Using the CYGAP has some important and well-acknowledged shortcomings. First, it assumes that bank credit 
and GDP share a common trend, which is unlikely to hold during the period studied due to financial 
development and the associated deepening of credit markets. In addition, the CYGAP also depends on how the 
trend is determined, which imposes the frequency, duration, and amplitude of the resulting cycles. 
4 Credit cycles have lower frequency than business cycles (Drehmann et al., 2012), which would imply using a 
larger λ. For example, the Bank of International Settlements uses 400,000 for quarterly data (Borio and Lowe, 
2002b) which would be equivalent to using 1,600 for annual data. We carried out a robustness check using 
1,600 with similar qualitative results. It is also worth noting that some papers apply a backward-looking, one-
sided HP filter, attempting to mimic the availability of data in real time to the policymaker (Gourinchas et al. 
2001). While this approach is attractive, it comes at the cost of underestimating the presence of credit booms 
and busts and exacerbating end-of-sample bias in the filtering process. Since we are not attempting to build a 
model to be used in real time, we exploit all the available data by applying a two-sided filter. 
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growth and GDP growth, and the implied changes in the credit-to-GDP ratios. Alongside, we 
study the extent of co-movement between credit growth and GDP growth throughout the 
credit cycles. Second, we study the relationship between credit reversals and banking crises, 
focusing on their relative timing and likelihood, conditional on the realization of the other. 
Finally, we explore the effect of credit reversals and banking crises on the credit cycle and on 
economic activity, providing an estimation of their costs in terms of output forgone. 
A.   Data 
Our focus on bank credit follows the bank lending channel literature (Bernanke and Gertler, 
1995; Kashyap and Stein 2000), which proposes that credit and market financing are 
imperfect substitutes. The paper exploits yearly data for 179 countries during 1960‒2017, 
which is all the data available from the International Financial Statistics (IFS). The yearly 
frequency avoids seasonal and high frequency patterns that are uninteresting for our 
purposes. Also, the yearly frequency allows us to capture the eventual build-up of slow-
moving but persistent macro-financial imbalances, which are critical from the systemic 
stability perspective. Credit is measured by domestic bank credit to the private sector (IFS 
line 22d), which excludes cross-border lending, and thus allows us to focus on the cyclical 
behavior of resident banks. Credit series are converted to real terms by using the GDP 
deflator, which is arguably more adequate (than the CPI) to capture the underlying structure 
of the credit portfolios. 
IV.   KEY FEATURES OF SHORT-TERM CREDIT-TO-GDP DYNAMICS 
In this section we provide an overview of the key features of short-term dynamics of the 
CREDIT-TO-GDP ratio. To do so, after HP-filtering the data, we identify the years marking the 
start and end of positive and negative CYGAP as well as the local maxima and minima 
corresponding to each cyclical phase. Following Claessens, Kose and Terrones (2011) we 
measure the following distances to characterize the credit cycles: 
• Positive Duration: the number of years with an uninterrupted positive CYGAP. 
• Negative Duration: the number of years with uninterrupted negative CYGAP. 
• Amplitude: the difference between the maximum and the minimum CYGAP in each 
cycle. 
• Downturn Duration: the number of years between the peak CYGAP and its subsequent 
minimum. 
• Upturn Duration: the number of years between the minimum CYGAP and its 
subsequent peak. 
• Deepening: the cumulative change in CREDIT-TO-GDP ratios during positive and 
negative CYGAP phases. 
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• Speed: the average compounded yearly growth rate of real credit during positive and 
negative CYGAP phases. 
Summary statistics of the resulting metrics are presented in Table 1. A total of 371 entire 
cycles are captured, plus some additional incomplete episodes at the start and end of the 
sampled period. On average, the entire cycle lasts about ten years, equally split between the 
positive and negative gaps, albeit it is convenient to stress that the duration and symmetry 
between ups and downs occurs by construction. 
Overall, credit-to-GDP ratios increase by about nine percentage points during positive gap 
episodes and drop by about two percentage points during the negative gaps, with industrial 
countries displaying a stronger deepening during the positive phase and more resilience 
during the negative. Contrary to our priors, average credit growth remains positive in both 
phases. Thus, negative gaps tend to reflect periods where GDP growth is relatively more 
dynamic than credit growth. The extreme gaps average 15 percent and ‒18 percent and tend 
to be wider in developing countries. The likelihood of observing a credit reversal during the 
negative phase is about 22 percent, almost two times higher than during positive gaps. These 
facts suggest that the degree of co-movement between credit and the CYGAP may not be that 
strong. This is explored in the next session. 
A.   How do credit and GDP co-move throughout the Credit Cycle? 
A cursory look at the co-movement between credit growth and GDP growth is presented in 
Figure 1. While the correlation is positive and statistically significant, as expected, its value 
is rather small (0.32), and close to zero during episodes of negative credit growth (0.09). 
Their directional co-movement is positive and driven by subset of years in which both GDP 
and credit expand. A comparison between the first and second quadrants provides casual 
evidence that credit reversals are associated with substantially lower GDP growth rates. 
However, there is a non-trivial amount of mass in the second and fourth quadrants. In fact, 
negative credit growth is observed in about one-quarter (23.4 percent) of the years in which 
economic activity expands, while positive credit growth is observed in about half (47.9 
percent) of the years with contracting activity (Table 2). 
Next, we assess the directional co-movement between credit and GDP growth with the 
concordance index proposed by Harding and Pagan (2002). Specifically, the concordance 
index for variables x and y over period t=1,…,T, is defined as: 
𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑥𝑥,𝑦𝑦 = 1𝑇𝑇�[(𝐷𝐷𝑥𝑥,𝑡𝑡 × 𝐷𝐷𝑦𝑦,𝑡𝑡) + (1 − 𝐷𝐷𝑥𝑥,𝑡𝑡) × (1 −𝐷𝐷𝑦𝑦,𝑡𝑡)]𝑡𝑡  
Where: 
Dx,t ={1 if the growth of variable x in period t is positive, and 0 otherwise} 
Dy,t ={1 if the growth of variable y in period t is positive, and 0 otherwise} 
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Accordingly, the index measures the proportion of the time where the two variables move in 
the same direction. It ranges from zero (lack of concordance) to one (perfect concordance), 
and is 0.5 for two unrelated series. The average concordance between credit growth and GDP 
growth is moderate (0.68 for developing countries and 0.73 for industrial countries), which is 
in line with the findings reported in Claessens, Kose and Terrones (2011) using a smaller 
dataset. Furthermore, concordance is almost exclusively driven by the periods of positive co-
movement, as reflected by the small distance between overall and positive concordance 
(Figure 2). Over time, there is a slight downward trend in concordance in industrial countries, 
and a sharp drop in the aftermath of the 2008‒09 crisis which may reflect a credit glut in 
bank balance sheets and the rapid development of shadow banking. 
Lastly, we explore the behavior of credit growth and GDP growth conditional on the CYGAP 
(Table 3).  While average credit growth remains positive during the two phases, it is 
considerably more volatile than GDP growth, particularly in developing countries. During 
the positive CYGAP phases, the average pace of credit growth is three to five times faster than 
GDP growth. In turn, during negative CYGAP episodes, the contractions of credit in a single 
year can be dramatic. 
B.   A Closer Look at Credit-to-GDP Dynamics 
Is the shape of the positive phase of CYGAP cycles systematically related with the shape of 
the subsequent negative phase? To answer this question, we collapse the time dimension of 
the data into the set of individual cycles. Our goal is to assess whether the key characteristics 
of the positive CYGAP episodes are associated with the features of their subsequent negative 
gap phases. Specifically, we are interested in assessing if the duration and amplitude of the 
CYGAPs, and the speed of credit growth and GDP growth during the positive gap episodes are 
systematically related to the dynamics of the subsequent negative gaps. We expect that more 
robust and protracted credit dynamics during the positive gap phase of the cycle would lead 
to deeper and more protracted slowdown of credit during the negative phase. To this end, we 
run a series of bi-variate regressions of selected characteristics of the negative gap phase on 
corresponding characteristics of the precedent positive phase, taken as explanatory variables. 
The results support our priors (Table 4). More sizable and long-lasting CYGAPs during the 
positive phase lead to deeper and longer negative gaps, and to lower credit and GDP growth 
during the subsequent negative phase. Similarly, larger increases in the credit-to-GDP ratio 
during the positive gap episodes lead to sharper subsequent declines in the credit-to-GDP 
ratio. Interestingly, there is no systematic relationship with the subsequent rates of credit 
growth or GDP growth, which suggests that both variables tend to move in opposite 
directions during the negative phase. Lastly and contrary to expectations, more dynamic 
credit growth and GDP growth during the positive gap episodes tend to exert a dampening 
effect on their subsequent dynamics during the negative phase. 
V.   CREDIT REVERSALS, BANKING CRISES AND THE CYGAP 
We now study the relationship between credit reversals and banking crises, by estimating the 
likelihood of each of these events in the years around the realization of the other. First, we 
construct a window centered on the occurrence of banking crises and compute the 
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probabilities of observing credit reversals five years before and five years after (i.e., 
considering the average cycle duration).5 Then, we construct a window centered on the 
occurrence of credit reversals and do a symmetrically reverse analysis. 
The results suggest that credit reversals are more likely to occur after banking crises (Figure 
3). For industrial countries for example, the likelihood of observing a credit reversal 
conditional on the occurrence of a previous banking crisis increases from about 8 percent to 
35 percent. For developing countries, the corresponding probabilities increase from 15 to 25 
percent. In contrast, banking crises tend to precede credit reversals in both groups of 
countries, and their likelihood drops after the credit reversals (Figure 4). Interestingly, the 
likelihood of banking crises tends to increase in the years leading to the credit reversal, 
suggesting that the latter could reflect a defense mechanism by banks to curb the buildup of 
excessive credit risk. 
Next, we study the likelihood of banking crises and credit reversals within the phases of the 
CYGAP cycles.  As a first pass, we compare the unconditional probabilities of crises and 
reversals versus their conditional pairs, in the positive and negative phases of the CYGAP 
cycles (Table 5). In line with the findings of Reinhart and Rogoff (2013), banking crises 
seem equally likely to happen across industrial and developing countries (roughly once every 
eight years). Credit reversals are relatively more frequent, particularly in developing 
countries (where they occur about once every five years). Looking at the conditional 
probabilities, banking crises are more likely to happen when the CYGAP is positive, a result 
mostly driven by the subsample of industrial countries. This fact is consistent with the view 
that crises are credit booms gone bad (Schularick and Taylor, 2012). In contrast, credit 
reversals are two times more likely to happen during negative CYGAPS, and the differences 
between developing and industrial countries seem unremarkable.  
What is the incidence of banking crises and credit reversals within the CYGAP cycles? Basel 
regulations on countercyclical bank capital buffers advocate for the use of the CYGAP as a 
reference metric for their implementation. This policy rests on the view that banking crises 
tend to happen at a relatively late stage in the positive phase of the CYGAP cycles, in the 
aftermath of rapid credit growth episodes. To test this view, we track the evolution of the 
yearly probabilities of banking crises and credit reversals within the cycles, using a ten-year 
window centered on the year when the CYGAP shifts from positive to negative.6 Surprisingly, 
the yearly probabilities of banking crises in developing countries are rather flat throughout 
the entire reference window (Figure 5). In sharp contrast, in industrial countries the 
likelihood of crises peaks early in the CYGAP cycle, four years before the CYGAP turns 
negative. These results suggest that the CYGAP may provide insufficient lead time for the 
buildup of bank capital buffers, posing questions on its adequacy as reference trigger for 
countercyclical capital buffers. In turn, the likelihood of credit reversals within cycles 
 
5 Robustness checks with seven-year windows (14-year cycles) produced similar results.  
6 The length of the window reflects the average duration of CYGAP cycles. Similar results were obtained using a 
14-year window.  
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follows a different pattern (Figure 6). It bottoms up early in the positive phase of the CYGAP 
cycle and increases monotonically afterward, peaking when the CYGAP becomes negative. 
What is the impact of credit reversals and banking crises on the shape of CYGAP cycles? To 
answer this question, we split the data in two groups: cycles with the presence of crises or 
reversals versus cycles with no crises/reversals, which we use as controls. Then, we compare 
the characteristics of the negative phase of the CYGAP across these two groups using the 
metrics described earlier. To facilitate the comparison, we run OLS regressions of cycle 
characteristics on a set of dummy variables that equal one for the cycles with crises/reversals. 
As before, we also split the sample across industrial and developing countries by using 
interacting dummies. Granted, these regressions do not establish causality and are only 
intended to facilitate the comparison across cycles. 
Not surprisingly, cycles with crises display a sharper collapse of credit growth during the 
negative CYGAP phase and are also more protracted, deeper and wider than those of the 
control group (Table 6, panel A). Across country groups, the differences between industrial 
and developing countries are not statistically significant, except for the amplitude and range 
of the CYGAP, which indicates a more severe collapse in developing countries. The results are 
also significant form the economic perspective. For example, the negative phase of the credit 
cycles with banking crises is on average 1.7 years longer than the control group, with a 
differential drop in credit-to-GDP ratios of 5 percentage points. 
The results for reversals are qualitatively similar, but the differences vis-à-vis the control 
group somewhat less prominent than those obtained for crises, except for the contraction in 
credit growth, which is almost two-times higher (Table 6, panel B). Also, the change in 
credit-to-GDP ratios associated with reversals compares in magnitude with the results of the 
crises. Thus, in terms of the impact on credit availability, credit reversals seem more 
constraining than crises, raising questions on their relative costs in terms of economic 
activity. Across country groups, it is remarkable that the duration of the negative phase is 
even longer for industrial countries, while the difference in the amplitude and range of their 
cycles vis-à-vis their control group remains narrower. In all, this suggests that reversals in 
industrial countries have a less severe, but more protracted, impact on credit dynamics. 
As a complementary exercise, we use the frequencies of reversals/crises within cycles as a 
proxy for their intensity and rerun the regressions by replacing the dummies with these 
frequencies (Table 6, panels C and D). Clearly, the negative phase of cycles with a higher 
incidence of banking crises tends to be longer and wider than cycles with no crises. Credit 
growth is also substantially slower in cycles with banking crises, leading to lower credit-to-
GDP ratios. Reversals are also associated with deeper, faster and wider drops in credit-to-
GDP ratios relative to their control group and, surprisingly, the contraction in credit and 
credit-to-GDP ratios relative to the control group is also more severe than the corresponding 
results associated with the banking crises. 
Besides statistical significance, virtually all the estimated coefficients are economically 
meaningful. To illustrate, we compute the effect of a one-standard deviation increase in the 
probabilities of reversals/crises on the cyclical characteristics of the negative phase (Table 7). 
So, for example, a 16-percentage point increase in the frequencies of banking crises (one 
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stadard deviation) leads to a ‒0.5 percentage point change in credit-to-GDP ratios during the 
negative CYGAP phase in developing countries and ‒0.9 in industrial, vis-à-vis their control 
groups. The same shock would lead to an increase in the duration of the negative phase of the 
CYGAP by about four months in developing countries (0.328 years) and two months in 
industrial. Surprisingly, the effects of credit reversals surpass those of banking crises across 
most variables. This picture suggests that credit reversals have large effects on economic 
activity. We explore this further in the next session. 
VI.   THE ECONOMIC COSTS OF CREDIT REVERSALS AND BANKING CRISES 
To provide a first approximation at the costs of reversals and crises we take the sets of 
CYGAP-based cycles used in the previous session and split the data in two groups, 
differentiating between cycles with reversals/crises from cycles with no reversals/crises, 
which we use as controls. As before, we establish a ten-year window centered on the years 
when the CYGAP turns negative. Using this reference window, we track the evolution of 
economic activity within cycles by computing the average output gaps and the average GDP 
growth for each group. 
Our focus is the estimation of the economic costs of credit reversals. A large body of 
literature has focused the economic costs of banking crises. Across the literature, the 
estimated costs of banking crises appear significant, with a relatively wide dispersion, 
ranging in most cases between 4‒15 percent of GDP (Table 8). Unfortunately, the 
comparability of the results is hampered by different crises definitions and dating, 
methodological approaches, and sample coverage. In many cases, the validity of results is 
also limited by the use of relatively small samples (typically less than 21 countries). 
We try to control for differences in methodology by applying the same approach to the 
estimation of credit reversals and banking crises. Thus, while our paper presents average cost 
estimates, emphasis in the interpretation is placed on the relative costs of reversals and crises, 
which we deem more robust to potential methodological flaws (such as endogeneity and 
omitted variables bias). 
The relative dynamics of the output gap and GDP growth across cycles with, and without, 
banking crises, are plotted in Figure 7. Clearly, the output gap, computed as the percent 
deviation of (the log of) GDP relative to its HP-filtered trend, displays wider swings in cycles 
with banking crises. The pattern is qualitatively similar across industrial and developing 
countries, albeit the later seem to quickly close the gap differentials. As for GDP growth, the 
set of cycles with banking crises overperform their control group early in the window but 
display a substantially lower pace afterwards, and the differences remain protracted, 
especially in industrial countries. This result is consistent with several papers that report 
larger economic costs of banking crises in industrial countries (for example, Bordo et al., 
2001; Cerra and Saxena, 2008; Laeven and Valencia, 2018). The parallel comparison for the 
case of credit reversals is presented in Figure 8. The magnitudes of the GDP growth 
differentials are comparable with those obtained for the case of banking crises but appear 
substantially more persistent in developing countries. 
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Using these results, we come up with an estimation of the costs of banking crises and credit 
reversals. To do so, we accumulate GDP growth for up to six years after the CYGAP turns 
negative and take the difference between cycles with- and without-crises. The starting point 
is guided by the fact that the output gap differential is close to zero. Yet, we acknowledge 
that this choice is rather arbitrary (we try to account for this below, by looking at the relative 
economic performances across the entire cycles). More importantly, this methodology 
assumes that crises and reversals are exogenous to economic performance which, as 
discussed previously, is unlikely. Under more plausible assumptions, if the likelihood of 
reversals/crises is endogenous and inversely related to the pace of economic activity, the 
estimated costs of reversals/crises presented here would be upward biased, thus providing a 
conservative estimate of the associated costs.  
The results (Table 9), indicate that banking crises have large and protracted costs in terms of 
forgone economic activity, which is consistent with Cerra and Saxena (2008). In developing 
countries, however, the median costs are significantly smaller than the mean (and in fact 
close to zero), suggesting that the mean is influenced by a smaller number of cases with very 
large output losses. In other words, the positive skewness of the distribution suggests that 
most developing countries tend to rebound quickly after banking crises. In contrast, the 
estimated costs for industrial countries are larger, of the order of 11 percentage points in 
terms of foregone output seven years after the start of the negative CYGAP. 
Consistent with our previous findings, the costs of credit reversals are also protracted and, in 
terms of magnitude, comparable with those of banking crises. It is important to stress that we 
are applying the same methodology to estimate the costs of crises and reversals. Thus, their 
relative orders of magnitude should stand as a robust indicator, provided that the reference 
window is suitable for both types of events, which is not necessarily the case. Furthermore, 
as discussed before, crises and reversals tend to come together, so their costs may get 
entangled. To account for this, we apply a second approach by computing two sets of panel 
regressions: 𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺 𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺ℎ𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  [1] 
and  𝐺𝐺𝐷𝐷𝐺𝐺 𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺ℎ𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = 𝛼𝛼𝑖𝑖 + 𝛽𝛽𝐺𝐺𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛾𝛾𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝛿𝛿𝐺𝐺𝐵𝐵𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡𝐺𝐺𝐶𝐶𝐶𝐶𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + 𝜀𝜀𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡  [2] 
Where GDP growth stands for yearly GDP growth; BC is a dummy variable that equals one 
for credit-to-GDP cycles that contained banking crises and zero otherwise; and CC is a 
dummy variable that equals one for credit-to-GDP cycles that contained banking crises and 
zero otherwise; PBC is the frequency of years with banking crises in the credit-to-GDP 
cycles; and PCC  is the frequency of years with credit reversals in the credit-to-GDP cycles. 
The sub-indexes i and t denote countries and time, respectively. Is it worth emphasizing that 
the explanatory variables do not vary within cycles. Therefore, their coefficients in regression 
[1] capture the differences in average GDP growth between the entire cycles with- and 
without- crises and reversals. In turn, the coefficients of the frequencies in regression [2] 
provide information on the effects of prevalence of banking crises and credit reversals on 
economic activity. A priory, we expect all the coefficients to be negative. 
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The results of equation [1] indicate that both banking crises and credit reversals have a 
substantial negative impact on economic activity, particularly in industrial countries (Table 
10). As for crises, the estimated drop in GDP growth (versus the control group) is 1.3 percent 
per year during the entire credit-to-GDP episodes. As the cycles last about ten years, the 
cumulative GDP differential stands at about 14 percentage points (=1.013^10‒1). This result 
is broadly consistent with our previous calculations, since the later were based on the 
differences during the negative phase of the cycle only. In fact, using the five-year average 
duration of the negative phase, the implied cumulative drop in GDP growth stands at around 
7 percent (=1.013^10‒1), which is comparable with the previous results. By comparison, the 
result is in the lower range of the estimations obtained by Hoggart, Reis and Saporta (2002) 
and seems slightly smaller than the averages reported in Laeven and Valencia (2018). 
Fundamentally, these results suggest that credit reversals have substantial economic costs, at 
about half of those associated with banking crises. Moreover, since reversals are more 
frequent than crises, their economic costs over time are even more substantial. To provide a 
broad estimation using the relative frequencies of reversals (about one every 7.6 years) and 
crises (about one every 5.1 years), the overall cost of reversals over time come to represent 
about two-thirds of those associated with banking crises (0.69 = 0.0060.013 × 7.65.1). These results 
provide strong support to macro-prudential policies that try to prevent supply-driven 
contractions in bank credit. 
We now turn to regression [2], which conveys information on the sensitivity of the costs in 
response to a one percentage point increase in the frequency of crises and reversals (Table 
11). The results are robust and consistent with the previous discussion. For brevity, it is 
worth highlighting only the similar magnitude of the coefficients associated with banking 
crises and credit reversals, and their large economic significance. For example, a one 
percentage point increase in the frequency of credit reversals leads to a drop of GDP growth 
of about 1.9 percentage point per year. Moreover, the estimated losses are larger for 
industrial countries, which is surprising considering their deeper money and capital markets 
and the availability of alternative financing sources to firms. 
VII.   CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The literature on the time dimension of systemic risk lacks consensus on the characterization 
and measurement of its fundamental building blocks. Operational definitions of basic objects 
such as credit booms and credit crunches are not yet universally accepted. As a result, 
comparing across studies remains difficult. In this paper we propose a definition of credit 
reversals based on the relative behavior of aggregate bank credit and economic activity. The 
definition is clean and stringent. As such, it excludes episodes where a supply-side 
contraction in bank credit may occur concurrently with a contraction in credit demand. 
Our methodology is based on event studies. It uses credit cycles, measured by the deviations 
of credit-to-GDP ratios from their HP-filtered trends, as the reference framework to collapse 
the time dimension. While this reference is endogenous to be behavior of credit and 
economic activity, it is still useful to analyze their relative dynamics. We acknowledge that 
the measurement of credit cycles using HP-filtered credit-to-GDP series is somewhat 
arbitrary. Our choice aims at facilitating the comparison with other papers and reflects its 
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widespread use in financial sector surveillance and macro-prudential policies (i.e., 
countercyclical capital buffers). 
The analysis uncovers robust connections between credit reversals, banking crises, and credit 
cycles and opens some avenues for future research. First, there is a large amount of work on 
the role of credit booms on the likelihood of subsequent financial crises. A parallel literature 
could focus on credit reversals. The results presented here suggest that credit reversals could 
reduce the likelihood of financial crises but falls short of establishing a causal relationship. 
Second, the fact that banking crises tend to occur early in the positive CYGAP phases of the 
credit cycles, raises questions on the adequacy of credit-to-GDP ratios as a metric to guide 
the implementation of countercyclical capital buffers. This paper suggests a rather loose 
connection between credit and GDP along the cycles based on CYGAP levels. Further research 
is needed on alternative metrics to track the evolution of macro-financial risks and anchor 
macroprudential policies. 
Finally, the economic costs of credit reversals appear significant, at about one-half of those 
obtained for banking crises and up to two-thirds when considering their relative frequencies. 
The impact of reversals and crises on economic activity seem larger in industrial than in 
developing countries, which may partly reflect the deeper banking and financial systems of 
the former but is also puzzling given the wider availability of financing sources to firms. 
Moreover, following a crisis, the rebound in economic activity in developing countries tends 
to be faster than in industrial. This may be due to systematic differences on the dampening 
role of FX rate depreciation and the supporting role of external demand (i.e., banking crises 
in industrial countries may have lager global effects on economic activity). Exploring the 
validity of these hypotheses is left for future work. 
These results do not imply a causal relationship running from reversals/crises to economic 
growth due to possible endogeneity or omitted variables. Under the plausible hypothesis that 
reversals/crises are more likely under sluggish economic growth, these cost estimates are 
likely to be upward biased, offering conservative estimates. 
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Total Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative Positive Negative
Developing Mean 10.3 5.0 5.2 0.069 -0.029 0.103 0.020 0.036 0.046 0.168 -0.198 0.119 0.219
Industrial Mean 11.2 5.1 6.0 0.141 0.001 0.076 0.040 0.031 0.039 0.119 -0.115 0.104 0.210
Total Sample Mean 10.6 5.0 5.4 0.089 -0.021 0.096 0.025 0.034 0.044 0.155 -0.176 0.115 0.217
Developing Median 10.0 5.0 5.0 0.051 -0.017 0.096 0.027 0.036 0.040 0.146 -0.160 0.000 0.143
Industrial Median 11.0 5.0 5.0 0.093 0.006 0.064 0.041 0.023 0.036 0.094 -0.082 0.000 0.101
Total Sample Median 10.0 5.0 5.0 0.062 -0.013 0.088 0.032 0.032 0.039 0.133 -0.138 0.000 0.143
Developing Std. Dev. 3.2 2.1 2.1 0.079 0.092 0.088 0.094 0.039 0.041 0.288 0.197 0.158 0.260
Industrial Std. Dev. 3.3 1.8 2.5 0.166 0.245 0.057 0.053 0.039 0.024 0.135 0.110 0.146 0.273
Total Sample Std. Dev. 3.2 2.0 2.3 0.114 0.151 0.082 0.085 0.039 0.037 0.257 0.182 0.155 0.263
Developing Percentile 80 13 7 7 0.121 0.032 0.151 0.082 0.061 0.065 0.316 -0.058 0.250 0.400
Industrial Percentile 80 14 7 8.5 0.249 0.101 0.118 0.084 0.052 0.056 0.200 -0.036 0.250 0.400
Total Sample Percentile 80 13 7 7 0.145 0.041 0.145 0.083 0.058 0.061 0.280 -0.048 0.250 0.400
Developing Percentile 20 7 3 3 0.015 -0.086 0.042 -0.049 0.011 0.022 0.038 -0.310 0.000 0.000
Industrial Percentile 20 8 3 4 0.038 -0.097 0.027 -0.003 0.006 0.019 0.030 -0.172 0.000 0.000
Total Sample Percentile 20 8 3 3 0.020 -0.087 0.036 -0.032 0.009 0.021 0.035 -0.269 0.000 0.000
Developing No. Obs. 268 293 288 293 288 293 288 293 288 377 377 377 419
Industrial No. Obs. 103 111 110 111 110 111 110 111 110 137 137 137 146
Total Sample No. Obs. 371 404 398 404 398 404 398 404 398 514 514 514 565
1/ Credit Cycle defined by the Credit-to-GDP Gap versus HP Trend using a smoothing parameter lambda=100.
This table presents selected sumary statistics of the credit-to-GDP cycle. The sample is split by developing and industrial countries.
Maximum Gap Prob. Credit CrunchDuration Change Credit-GDP Credit Growth GDP Growth
All Sample Developing Industrial
Negative Positive Total Negative Positive Total Negative Positive Total
Negative GDP Growth
No. Obs. 557 513 1,070 456 401 857 101 112 213
Row Percent 52.06 47.94 100 53.21 46.79 100 47.42 52.58 100
Column Percent 27.52 9.66 14.59 28.08 10.16 15.38 25.25 8.24 12.1
Positive GDP Growth
No. Obs. 1467 4,795 6,262 1168 3,547 4,715 299 1248 1547
Row Percent 23.43 76.57 100 24.77 75.23 100 19.33 80.67 100
Column Percent 72.48 90.34 85.41 71.92 89.84 84.62 74.75 91.76 87.9
Total
No. Obs. 2,024 5,308 7,332 1,624 3,948 5,572 400 1,360 1,760
Row Percent 27.61 72.39 100 29.15 70.85 100 22.73 77.27 100
Column Percent 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100
Credit Growth
This table presents the frequencies of credit growth and GDP growth. The sample is split by episodes of positive and negative 
growth in the variables, and by industrial versus developing countries.
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Table 3. Summary Statistics of Credit Growth and GDP Growth Conditional on the 
Phases of Credit-to-GDP Cycles, 1960‒2017 
 
 
Table 4. Bivariate OLS Regressions of Cyclical Parameters 
of Credit-to-GDP Cycles, 1960‒2017 
 
This table presents the results of bivariate OLS regressions of key parameters of the credit-to-GDP 
cycle during negative gap episodes (the variables in the columns) as a function of the corresponding 
parameters during the previous positive phase of the cycle (the variables in the rows). The regressions 
include a constant (not reported). 
 
 
Mean Median 10 Percentile 90 Percentile No. Obs.
Credit GDP Credit GDP Credit GDP Credit GDP Credit GDP
Developing
Negative Gap 0.051 0.045 0.042 0.044 -0.169 -0.009 0.259 0.095 2997 2997
Positive Gap 0.143 0.037 0.093 0.039 -0.051 -0.021 0.340 0.091 2688 2688
Industrial
Negative Gap 0.050 0.040 0.048 0.037 -0.051 0.005 0.147 0.084 937 937
Positive Gap 0.086 0.030 0.058 0.028 -0.026 -0.016 0.207 0.077 861 861
Total Sample
Negative Gap 0.051 0.044 0.045 0.042 -0.144 -0.004 0.231 0.094 3934 3934
Positive Gap 0.129 0.035 0.083 0.036 -0.043 -0.020 0.309 0.089 3549 3549















Positive Phase of Credit to GDP Gap
Max Gap -0.161*** 1.449*** -0.010 -0.009*** -0.030*** 0.006
[0.028] [0.251] [0.011] [0.003] [0.010] [0.005]
Duration -0.002 0.329*** -0.004** -0.001 0.000 -0.001
[0.004] [0.039] [0.002] [0.000] [0.002] [0.001]
Change Credit to GDP 0.198* 1.492 -0.215*** -0.089*** 0.057 -0.004
[0.103] [1.022] [0.043] [0.011] [0.040] [0.022]
Speed Credit GDP 0.562* -7.987*** -0.551*** -0.292*** 0.075 0.045
[0.302] [2.656] [0.112] [0.027] [0.105] [0.058]
Yearly credit growth -0.045 -0.865** 0.034* -0.003 -0.026 0.047***
[0.048] [0.408] [0.017] [0.004] [0.016] [0.009]
Yearly GDP growth 0.400** -3.023* 0.104 0.031* 0.158** 0.090**
[0.202] [1.772] [0.076] [0.019] [0.070] [0.038]
Negative Phase of Credit to GDP Gap
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Table 5. Probabilities of Banking Crises and Credit Reversals 
Conditional on the Credit-to-GDP Gap, 1960‒2017 
  














Total 288 1184 2216 5824 0.130 0.203
Positive Gap 152 342 1060 2763 0.143 0.124
Negative Gap 136 842 1156 3061 0.118 0.275
Industrial
Total 132 305 970 1836 0.136 0.166
Positive Gap 90 94 448 880 0.201 0.107
Negative Gap 42 211 522 956 0.080 0.221
Total Sample
Total 420 1489 3186 7660 0.132 0.194
Positive Gap 242 436 1508 3643 0.160 0.120
Negative Gap 178 1053 1678 4017 0.106 0.262
This table presents the conditional probabilities of banking crises conditional on the credit-to-GDP gap. Credit 
Reversals are defined as episodes where there is a simultaneous ocurrence of negative credit growth and positive 
GDP growth.
 -20- 
Table 6. OLS Regressions of Selected Credit Cycle Characteristics 










Credit to GDP in 
Negative Phase
Speed of 
Change in Credit 










A. Explanatory: Dummy Banking Crises
Cycles with Banking Crises 1.745*** -0.050*** -0.015*** -0.031** -0.204*** -0.080**
[0.284] [0.013] [0.004] [0.014] [0.055] [0.034]
Cycles with Banking Crises x Industrial 0.160 0.017 0.005 0.039* 0.221** 0.110**
[0.460] [0.021] [0.007] [0.023] [0.089] [0.056]
Constant 3.435*** -0.012*** -0.008*** 0.011** -0.278*** -0.135***
[0.087] [0.004] [0.001] [0.004] [0.016] [0.010]
Observations 938 938 938 938 1046 1046
R-squared 0.059 0.018 0.015 0.005 0.013 0.006
B. Explanatory: Dummy Credit Reversals
Cycles with Credit Reversals 1.053*** -0.042*** -0.008*** -0.056*** -0.156*** -0.058***
[0.178] [0.008] [0.003] [0.009] [0.032] [0.020]
Cycles with Credit Reversals x Industrial 1.007*** -0.014 -0.006 0.030** 0.112** 0.056*
[0.248] [0.011] [0.004] [0.012] [0.047] [0.030]
Constant 2.833*** 0.012* -0.004* 0.043*** -0.210*** -0.111***
[0.142] [0.006] [0.002] [0.007] [0.024] [0.015]
Observations 938 938 938 938 1,046 1,046
R-squared 0.069 0.035 0.015 0.043 0.024 0.009
C. Explanatory: Frequency Banking Crises
Frequency of Banking Crisis in Cycle 1.095* -0.049 -0.023** -0.069*** -0.402*** -0.161***
[0.586] [0.033] [0.011] [0.023] [0.054] [0.028]
Freq. Banking Crisis x Industrial 0.947 -0.047 0.003 0.085* 0.424*** 0.176***
[1.126] [0.063] [0.022] [0.044] [0.106] [0.055]
Constant 3.645*** -0.023*** -0.013*** 0.006 -0.236*** -0.097***
[0.139] [0.008] [0.003] [0.005] [0.012] [0.006]
Observations 455 455 455 455 522 522
R-squared 0.015 0.01 0.011 0.021 0.097 0.061
D. Explanatory: Frequency Credit Reversals
Frequency of Credit Reversal in Cycle -0.013 -0.157*** -0.037*** -0.216*** -0.281*** -0.099*
[0.496] [0.021] [0.007] [0.023] [0.088] [0.055]
Freq. Credit Reversal x Industrial 2.736*** -0.206*** -0.043*** 0.085** 0.292* 0.158
[0.837] [0.036] [0.012] [0.039] [0.156] [0.098]
Constant 3.589*** 0.019*** -0.002 0.047*** -0.253*** -0.127***
[0.122] [0.005] [0.002] [0.006] [0.021] [0.013]
Observations 938 938 938 938 1,046 1,046
R-squared 0.012 0.119 0.053 0.085 0.011 0.004
Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
This table presents a set of OLS regressions of selected characteristics of credit cycles, presented in the columns, on four groups of explanatory 
variables. The regressions displayed in panel A use a dummy variable that equals one for cycles with the presence of banking crises and zero 
otherwise. The regressions in panel B use a dummy variable that equals one for cycles with the presence of credit reversals and zero otherwise. 
Panels C and D present parallel regressions using the within-cycle frequencies of banking crises and credit reversals as a proxy for their 
intensity. 
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Table 7. Estimated Impact of an Increase in the Frequency of 


























Reg. Coefficient 1.095 -0.049 -0.023 -0.069 -0.00 -0.402 -0.161
St. Dev. Banking Crises 0.157 0.157 0.157 0.157 0.157 0.157 0.157
Estimated Impact 0.171 -0.008 -0.004 -0.011 0.000 -0.063 -0.025
Industrial Countries
Reg. Coefficient 2.042 -0.089 -0.020 0.016 -0.020 0.022 0.015
St. Dev. Banking Crises 0.161 0.161 0.161 0.161 0.161 0.161 0.161
Estimated Impact 0.328 -0.014 -0.003 0.003 -0.003 0.004 0.002
Credit Reversals
Developing Countries
Reg. Coefficient -0.013 -0.157 -0.037 -0.216 -0.018 -0.281 -0.099
St. Dev. Credit Reversals 0.190 0.190 0.190 0.190 0.190 0.190 0.190
Estimated Impact -0.002 -0.030 -0.007 -0.041 -0.003 -0.053 -0.019
Industrial Countries
Reg. Coefficient 2.717 -0.357 -0.037 -0.136 -0.018 0.009 0.051
St. Dev. Credit Reversals 0.187 0.187 0.187 0.187 0.187 0.187 0.187
Estimated Impact 0.509 -0.067 -0.007 -0.025 -0.003 0.002 0.010
This Table presents the impact of a one-standard deviation increase in the frequency of banking crises and credit reversals on selected characteristics of the 
negative phase of credit cycles, presented in the columns. The impact is measured in terms of differencial effects vs. cycles without crises/reversals. The 
frequencies of crises and reversals are computed by dividing the number of years with crises/reversals within cycles over the total number of years in the 
corresponding cycles. The calculations use the results of the OLS regressions presented in Table 7.
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Differencial Effects between 
Industrial and Developing 
Countries Comments
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009) 18 countries; 1899-2007 9.3 1.9 years Not studied
Bordo et al. (2001) 21 countries, 1973-1997 6.2-7.0 3.1 Larger impact on industrial 
countries
Schularick and Taylor (2012) 14 countries, 1870-2008 4.1-7.9 5 years Not studied
Jorda, Schularick, and Taylor 
(2013)
14 countries, 1870-2008 4 4 years Not studied Compare across recessions with and without banking 
crises
Cerra and Saxena (2008) 190 countries, 1960-2001 7.5 10 years Larger and more protracted 
impact on high income 
countries
Laeven and Valencia (2018) 160 countries, 1970-2017 35 (industrial countries); 
13.8 (low- and middle-
income countries)
More than 8 years Higher and more persistent 
output losses in industrial 
countries; very assymetric 
distribution of costs among low- 
and middle-income countries
Claessens, Kose and Terrones 
(2008, 2010)
21 OECD countries, 1960-2007 Median: 2.2; Mean: 9.4-
21.9 
Median: 1.2 years; 
Mean: 1.5-1.7 years
Not studied
Hoggart, Reis, and Saporta 
(2002)
47 countries, 1977-1998 Industrial: 13.2-20.7; 
Medium and Low 
Income countries: 13.9-
15.0
Industrial: 4.1; Medium 
and Low Income 
countries: 3.3
Output losses in industrial 
countries larger than in 
emerging market countries
Romer and Romer (2017) 24 OECD countries, 1967-2012 4-6 3.5-5 years Not studied Wide variation in the estimated costs across countries. 
The exclusion of a few outliers has a large effect on the 
average estimated costs.
This table presents summary results of papers that focus on the estimation of economic costs of banking crises.
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Table 9. Costs of Banking Crises and Credit Reversals 
Cumulative GDP Growth Differential, 1960‒2017 
 
 
Mean Median Mean Median
Developing Countries
Year 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Year 1 -0.0189 -0.0085 -0.0018 -0.0094
Year 2 -0.0224 -0.0069 -0.0143 -0.0221
Year 3 -0.0194 -0.0001 -0.0241 -0.0443
Year 4 -0.0018 0.0173 -0.0332 -0.0612
Year 5 -0.0176 0.0097 -0.0590 -0.0982
Year 6 -0.0503 0.0023 -0.0547 -0.1072
Industrial Countries
Year 0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000
Year 1 -0.0167 -0.0132 -0.0181 -0.0113
Year 2 -0.0395 -0.0343 -0.0293 -0.0262
Year 3 -0.0650 -0.0553 -0.0392 -0.0417
Year 4 -0.0776 -0.0725 -0.0639 -0.0615
Year 5 -0.0897 -0.0869 -0.0876 -0.0816
Year 6 -0.1010 -0.1057 -0.0984 -0.0953
This table presents the estimated costs of banking crises and credit reversals in industrial and 
developing countries. The costs are computed as the difference in cumulative GDP growth 
between credit cycles with and without the presence of banking crises (or credit reversals). The 
starting point (Year 0) is the year when the credit-to-GDP gap turns negative.
Banking Crises Credit Reversals
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Table 10. Fixed-Effect Regressions of GDP Growth 
on Banking Crises and Credit Reversals, 1960‒2017 
 
[1] [2] [3] [4]
All Sample All Sample Developing Industrial
Dummy for Cycles with Banking Crises (DBC) -0.013** -0.013* -0.012 -0.013***
[0.005] [0.007] [0.010] [0.004]
Dummy for Cycles with Credit Reversals (DCC) -0.006*** -0.006** -0.004 -0.011**
[0.002] [0.002] [0.003] [0.004]
DBC x DCC 0.004 0.004 0.005 0.004
[0.006] [0.008] [0.011] [0.005]
Constant 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.045*** 0.044***
[0.002] [0.002] [0.002] [0.003]
Observations 7205 7205 5465 1740
R-squared 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.027
Number of countries 177 177 139 38
Sigma_u 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.018
Sigma_e 0.059 0.059 0.065 0.039
Rho 0.103 0.103 0.091 0.171
Average obs per group 40.7 40.7 39.3 45.8
Min obs per group 2 2 2 15
Max obs per group 57 57 57 57
Robust errors No Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.0
This table presents the results of fixed effect regressions of yearly GDP growth on a set of dummy 
variables that serve to split the sample into credit-to-GDP cycles with banking crises and credit 
reversals from cycles without the incidence of these events.
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Table 11. Fixed-Effect Regressions of GDP Growth on 




[1] [2] [3] [4]
All Sample All Sample Developing Industrial
Frequency of Banking Crisis in Cycle (PBC) 1/ -0.021*** -0.021* -0.021 -0.028***
[0.008] [0.011] [0.015] [0.009]
Frequency of Credit Reversal in Cycle (PCC) 1/ -0.019*** -0.019*** -0.014** -0.033**
[0.005] [0.005] [0.006] [0.014]
PBC x PCC 0.025 0.025 0.035 0.038
[0.031] [0.037] [0.054] [0.039]
Constant 0.044*** 0.044*** 0.045*** 0.041***
[0.001] [0.001] [0.001] [0.002]
Observations 7205 7205 5465 1740
R-squared 0.004 0.004 0.002 0.023
Number of countries 177 177 139 38
Sigma_u 0.020 0.020 0.020 0.017
Sigma_e 0.059 0.059 0.065 0.039
Rho 0.103 0.103 0.091 0.162
Average obs per group 40.7 40.7 39.3 45.8
Min obs per group 2 2 2 15
Max obs per group 57 57 57 57
Robust errors No Yes Yes Yes
Standard errors in brackets
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.0
1/ Frequency is the proportion of years with banking crises or credit reversals within cycles. 
This table presents the results of fixed effect regressions of yearly GDP growth on the frequencies of 
banking crises and credit reversals within credit-to-GDP cycles.
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Figure 1. Bank Credit and Economic Activity 
Yearly growth rates, in percent, 1960‒2017 
 


















Figure 2. Evolution of Concordance between Credit and GDP Growth, 1960‒2017 
 
This figure shows the evolution of concordance between credit growth and GDP growth 




















Figure 3. Probabilities of Credit Reversals around Banking Crises, 1960‒2017 
 
 
This figure presents the yearly probabilities of banking crises around the ocurrence of 
banking crises. The ten-year window is centered at the start of the banking crises 



































Note: Time window centered on banking crises
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Figure 4. Probabilities of Banking Crises Around Credit Reversals, 1960‒2017
 
 
This figure presents the yearly probabilities of banking crises around the ocurrence of 

































Note: Time window centered on credit reversals
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Note: Time window centered when the Credit-to-GDP gap goes from positive to negative
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Note: Time window centered when the Credit-to-GDP gap goes from positive to negative
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Figure 7. GDP Dynamics Conditional on Banking Crises, 1960‒2017 
 
 





























































































































Note: Window centered when the Credit-to-GDP Gaps goes from positive to negative
